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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
the law does not prescribe a definite rule for the determination of
the exact amount recoverable for false imprisonment. 10 The only
solution is the considered judgment and opinion of the reasonable
man.17 Where the issue of reputation is paramount and the jury
is denied access to relevant evidence of reputation, the appellate
courts must remand for a new trial,h as m the instant case. There
is no requirement that the testimony of witnesses be uniformly
favorable or unfavorable regarding the litigant's reputation, only
that it be allowed for consideration.'
North Dakota apparently has not considered the issue of alleged
damage to general reputation in false imprisonment or any other
civil action. The cases in other jurisdictions are generally quite old
and relatively infrequent. Their value as precedent is not diminished,
however, as their results are consistent and represent the correct
application of the rules of evidence.
The admissibility of reputation evidence in those civil actions
where reputation is placed directly m issue may well be settled.
The instant case is representative of the authorities cited herein,
and North Dakota could well use that court's reasoning as a guide-
line when the issue arises. Compensatory damages should, insofar
as possible, compensate the plaintiff in the amount of the damages
suffered. To arrive at a just amount, however, the defendant must be
allowed to show any mitigating facts or circumstances which
would properly influence the determination of those damages.
Perhaps no precise formula will ever be developed to determine
the amount of compensation for non-pecuniary loss of reputation,
nor is one needed if the jury is allowed to consider all of the
relevant evidence. It is only just that a man of good repute should
recover more than the man with a doubtful reputation.
BRUCE E. BOHLMAN
NEGLIGENCE-EVIDENCE-REBUTTAL OF REs IPSA LoQuiTuR-The
defendant, while using a rented truck to haul hay, had backed the
vehicle up to a barn to discharge the third load for the day when
a fire started in the barn, resulting in a complete loss of both the
hay and the barn. The Supreme Court of California, in a 4-3 decision
16. Herbrick v. Samardick & Co., 169 Neb. 833, 101 N.W.2d 488 (1960).
17. Burns v. Burns, aupra note 12.
18. Price V. Phillips, 90 N.J. Super. 480, 218 A.2d 167 (.1966).
19. In re Greenfieids Estate. 245 S.C. 595, 141 SoE.2d 916 (1965).
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affirming the trial court, held that the fire was caused by "hot
gasses and sparks from the exhaust system of the truck" and that
under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur the defendant was liable
for negligence. The dissent emphasized that the defendant had intro-
duced evidence that tended to rebut the inference of negligence
and that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should not have been
applied. Seely v Combs, 52 Cal. Rptr 578, 416 P.2d 810 (1966)
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur deals with a type of circum-
stantial evidence which allows the plaintiff to shift the burden of
going forward with the evidence to the defendant.1 It makes a
prima facie case against the defendant by raising an inference of
negligence2  which the defendant may rebut with the proper
evidence.
3
The California Supreme Court m Ybarra v Spanard4 set forth
prerequisites to the application of res ipsa loquitur:
(1) The accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does
not occur in the absence of someone's negligence;
(2) the accident must have been caused within the exclusive
control of the defendant;
(3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary
act on the part of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff, when availing himself of the doctrine must prove
the existence of the elements required for its application.5 To dispel
the inference of negligence as a -matter of law, the defendant must
produce affirmative evidence that tends to meet or balance the
inferences created by the doctrine.6 If such proof will rebut the
plaintiff's evidence, thereby revoking the use of res ipsa loquitur,
the burden of going forward with the evidence reverts to the plain-
tiff.7 The California Supreme Court has said that where evidence
which would tend to rebut the inference of negligence is introduced
by the defendant, it is a question of fact rather than a question of
law whether this inference has been overcome."
To offset the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
the defendant, in the instant case produced the following evidence:
1. See generally Rose v. Melody Lane, 39 Cal.2d 481, 247 P.2d 335 (1952).
2. Ales v. Ryan. 8 Cal.2d 82, 64 P.2d 409 (1936).
3. See Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954).
4. 25 Cal.2d 468, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
5. See Larson v. St. Francis Hotel, 83 Cal. App. 210, 188 P.2d 513 (1948).
6. See generally Dimari v. Cresci, 58 Cal.2d 292, 23 Cal. Rptr. 772, 373 P.2d 860 (1962).
Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hosp., 47 Cal.2d 509, 305 P.2d 36 (1956). A few juris-
dictions may treat the inference as a presumption requiring a directed verdict for the
plaintiff if the defendant offers no evidence in explanation. See Burr v. Sherwin Williams
Co., aupra note 3.
7. See Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., .supra note 8 at 1046.
8. Druzanick v. Crily, 19 Cal.2d 439, 122 P.2d 58 (1942).
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The truck's exhaust system had been examined immediately after
the occurrence of the fire and nothing improper was found; the
muffler was of the type prescribed by statute in California; 9 the
muffler was of a type that had low gas pressure allowing the gasses
to cool; there were no leaks found; the fire was said to have started
on the right side of the truck while the exhaust system was located
on the left; the defendant also provided evidence that the truck,
in substantially unchanged condition, had been tested at a date sub-
sequent to the fire. These tests established that the truck would
neither backfire nor would the exhaust gasses ignite a gasoline
soaked rag.
Although the California Supreme Court in Viera v Atchison,
T. & S.F Ry.10 stated that absolute certainty of the defendant's
responsibility for the damaging occurrence is seldom possible, it
also stated that a reasonable probability is necessary In the instant
case the court failed to consider the fact that improperly cured hay
might ignite spontaneously" Also, since the defendant had been
hired to perform this service, he must have been directed by the
plaintiff to put the hay in the barn. A third possibility is that the
defendant's employee, who was absent at the time of trial, may
have had some part in starting the fire. These three arguments
demonstrate that the occurrence might have taken place in the
absence of any negligence, that the plaintiff may not have wholly
divested himself of control, or that the cause of the fire was wholly
unrelated to the condition of the truck. Considering that all the
requirements for its application may not have been met, it appears
that this was not a proper case for the invocation of the doctrine.
In applying the doctrine, North Dakota courts have generally
followed the California decisions. 12 The North Dakota Supreme
Court, however, has said that only after the evidence has shown
that the "thing" did cause the injury, may the doctrine raise a
presumption of negligence.' 3 It has also held that negligence must
be affirmatively proved; it is not sufficient merely to prove that
an occurrence took place for which the defendant may be respon-
sible.14 Under these cases, North Dakota appears to place upon
the plaintiff a greater burden than the California court did in the
9. Statutes of California, 1964-65, ch. 1144, P. 2828, § 9.4.
10. 10 Cal. App, 267, 101 Pac. 690 (1909).
11. Hay that is improperly cured, i.e. not allowed to dry thoroughly before baling, is
likely to ignite spontaneously. The plaintiff should be required to show that the hay had
been properly cured.
12. See McKenzie v. Hanson, 143 N.W.2d 697 (N.D. 1966), Bergley v. Mann's, 99 N.W.2d
849 (N.D. 1959), Kuntz v. McQuade, 95 N.W.2d 430 (N.D. 1959).
13. Farmers Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grand Forks Implement Co., 79 N.D. 177, 55 N.W.2d
215 (1953).




That the Restatement position relative to the application of
res ipsa loquitur is somewhat different from that of either the
California or North Dakota courts is illustrated by the following
section thereof:
It may be inferred that harm suffered by the plaintiff is
caused by the negligence of the defendant when
(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur
in the absence of negligence;
(b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the
plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated
by the evidence;
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the de-
fendant's duty to the plaintiff. 5
It should be noted that the Restatement is unique m that it requires
the plaintiff to produce evidence as to what did not cause the
accident.
According to the Restatement, res ipsa loquitur should place
liability for negligence upon a defendant only when the plaintiff
has shown that there is no other reasonable explanation for the
accident or occurrence. Once the plaintiff has obviated these other
possible causes of the accident, the burden of showing his faultless
conduct lies with the defendant. When the defendant does not meet
this burden, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply But
when the defendant produces sufficient credible evidence to mitigate
his responsibility concerning the accident, it should be the duty of
the court to direct a verdict for the defendant because the plaintiff
can no longer rely on res ipsa loquitur
Application of this interpretation of the Restatement, places the
defendant in a more equitable position. It also insures that a plaintiff
who wishes to sue cannot rely solely on the doctrine, but must have
some affirmative evidence eliminating other reasonable causes. In
the instant case, had the court applied the Restatement approach,
the action against the defendant could not have rested on the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur because the plaintiff had not eliminated these
other reasonable causes of the fire.
Consequently, it appears that the Restatement position is pref-
erable to the view held by the courts examined here. A rule requiring
the plaintiff to produce the type of evidence required by the Restate-
ment seems to be a desirable addition to the doctrine as it is now
15. RUSTATMmNT (SfcOND), TORTS §328 D (1965).
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enforced by the courts. It would bar the plaintiff's access to res
ipsa loquitur until he can produce some affirmative evidence. This
is m opposition to the present day doctrine which allows the plain-
tiff to use res ipsa loquitur when he cannot show the negligence
of the defendant. By requiring this additional evidence, the courts
can insure a better application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
RONALD D. MARKOVITS
PRODUCTS LIABILITY-BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY-MANUFAC-
TURERS' LIABILITY TO ULTIMATE CONSUMERS-A seven week old
child, living next door, used a vaporizer-humidifier purchased by
his aunt for the ordinary purpose of relieving nasal congestion.
The humidifier shot boiling water upon the child resulting in his
death three days later. The administrator of the child's estate sought
damages for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability
against the retailer, wholesaler-distributor and manufacturer of the
product. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, limiting liability to
the retailer, held that the administrator could bring an action against
the seller notwithstanding decedent's lack of privity of contract.
Miller v Preitz, 221 A.2d 320 (Pa. 1966)
The majority opinion was based upon theUniform Commercial
Code, Section 2-318, which provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to
any natural person who is in the family or household of
his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reason-
able to expect that such a person may use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach
of the warranty *1
Under the court's interpretation of this section, the deceased nephew
was in the buyer's "family," and, further, the section could not
be construed to maintain an action m assumpsit against remote
sellers. Dissenting opinions attacked both the fictional approach to
the inclusion of the decedent within the buyer's family and the
inequitable placement of liability The dissenters contended that
the majority opinion ignored comment three of Section 2-318 which
stated:
1. 12A PA. STAT. ANN. § 2-318 (195S).
